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Abstract
We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price
payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study
the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show for a variety of equilibrium
concepts, including Bayes-Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium, the resulting price of
anarchy bound is close to the approximation factor of the underlying greedy algorithm.
1 Introduction
The field of algorithmic mechanism design studies systems that depend upon interaction with
participants whose behaviour is motivated by their own goals, rather than those of a designer.
Relevant solutions must therefore merge the computational considerations of computer science with
the game-theoretic insights of economics. The focus of this paper is the multi-parameter domain
of combinatorial allocation problems when the goal is to assign m objects to n agents in order
to maximize the social welfare, subject to arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraints. This
class includes all combinatorial auction problems that allow single-minded declarations including
multi-unit combinatorial auctions, unsplittable flow problems, and many others.
For the goal of optimizing social welfare, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mecha-
nism addresses game-theoretic issues in a strong sense. In the absense of collusion, it induces full
cooperation (ie. truthtelling) as a dominant strategy. However, the VCG mechanism requires that
the underlying welfare-maximization problem be solved exactly. For all but the simplest settings,
this optimality requirement is undesirable: exact maximization may be computationally intractible,
it may require an unrealistic amount of communication from the buyers, and the resulting winner
determination rules may be difficult to explain to a typical participant. One way to bypass these
complexity issues is to design new, specially-tailored mechanisms for specific assignment problems.
Indeed, there has been significant progress in designing dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC) alternatives to the VCG mechanism. While this venture has been largely successful in
settings where agent preferences are single-dimensional [1, 8, 20, 25], general settings have proven
more difficult. It has been shown that the approximation ratios achieveable by DSIC mechanisms
and their non-incentive compatible counterparts exhibit a large asymptotic gap for some problems
[28, 14, 16, 15].
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Alternatively, one might study classes of “natural” allocation algorithms, that appear intuitive
as auction allocation rules, with the hope that they have desireable incentive properties when imple-
mented as mechanisms. As it turns out, for many combinatorial allocation problems, conceptually
simple deterministic algorithms (e.g. greedy algorithms) meet or approach the best-known approx-
imation factors subject to computational constraints [20, 25, 8, 2]. These natural methods tend
to be computationally efficient and easy for bidders to understand, which are desirable properties
in auctions. Unfortunately, such algorithms are not, in general, DSIC [20, 6]. Rather than aban-
doning these methods in favor of other, potentially more complex, mechanisms, we are pursuing
an alternative approach. Namely, rather than striving for dominant strategy truthfulness, it may
be acceptable for a system to admit strategic manipulation, so long as the designer’s objectives
are met after such manipulation occurs. To this end, we explore the performance of mechanisms
at equilibria of bidder behavior, given an appropriate model of beliefs. Broadly speaking, our mo-
tivating question is: When can an algorithm be implemented as a mechanism that achieves high
social welfare at every equilibrium?1 And how robust are the resulting mechanisms to variations
of the equilibrium concept?
We demonstrate that for combinatorial allocation problems, any “greedy-like” approximation
algorithm can be converted into a mechanism that achieves nearly the same approximation factor
at every equilibrium of bidder behaviour. Our analysis is very general, and applies to a range of
different equilibrium concepts, including pure and mixed Nash equilibria, Bayes-Nash equilibria,
and Bayesian equilibria with correlated types. We are thus able to decouple computational issues
from incentives issues for this class of algorithms, as one can design a greedy algorithm without
considering its economic implications, and then apply a straightforward pricing scheme in order to
achieve good performance at equilibrium.
Performance of games at equilibrium has been studied extensively in the algorithmic game
theory literature as the price of anarchy (POA) of a given game 2: the ratio between the optimal
outcome and the worst-case outcome at any equilibrium [27]. Put into these terms, our goal is to
convert an algorithm with approximation factor c ≥ 1 into a mechanism whose price of anarchy is
not much larger than c.
This paper is a synthesis and revision of results in original conference version of this work [22]
and results in the first author’s thesis [21]. The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this
section outlines our results and relates our work to recent papers in this area. Section 2 defines the
necessary concepts and applications for our results. Section 3 introduces the concept of strongly
loser-independence (generalizing the loser-independence concept from [11]) which becomes the key
property of greedy algorithms that we will exploit. Sections 4 and 5 analyze (respectively) price of
anarchy results for first-price and critical-price mechanisms. Section 6 concludes with some open
problems.
1Dominant strategy truthfulness of an approximation mechanism is conceptually stronger as a solution concept
than that of a mechanism that approximates the optimal social welfare at every equilibrium. However, as noted
elsewhere [12], Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not, strictly speaking, a relaxation of dominant strategy truthfulness.
There exist truthful mechanisms whose approximation ratios are not preserved at all Nash equilibria, such as the
famous Vickrey auction.
2For the purpose of this paper, we shall not consider cost minimization problems. We note that the price of
anarchy concept was introduced in terms of cost minimization games but to the best of our knowledge the only price
of anarchy results for mechanism induced games apply to maximization problems.
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1.1 Our Results
The basic question of algorithmic mechanism design is this: when can computationally efficient
algorithms be converted into mechanisms that preserve approximation bounds with respect to
truthfulness or POA results? We address the price of anarchy considerations with respect to
social welfare maximization for a broad class of allocation problems. In the full information and
Bayesian setting, we study the price of anarchy for first price and critical price mechanisms derived
from greedy algorithms. Roughly speaking (and in contrast to results regarding approximation and
truthful mechanisms) we are able to show that there is often little or no loss from the approximation
ratio of a greedy algorithm to the corresponding mechanism price of anarchy.
We consider one-shot auctions, in which the allocation problem is resolved once. Following
Christodoulou et al. [12], we focus our attention on the standard (in economics) incomplete infor-
mation setting, where the appropriate equilibrium concept is Bayes-Nash equilibrium. That is, we
assume that agents’ preferences are private, but drawn independently from commonly-known prior
distributions, and that players apply strategies at equilibrium given this partial knowledge. We
pose the question: can a given black-box approximation algorithm be converted into a mechanism
that approximately preserves its approximation ratio at every Bayes-Nash Equilibrium? We show
that for a broad class of greedy algorithms, the answer is yes.
Theorem (informal): SupposeA is a greedy c-approximate allocation rule for a combinatorial
allocation problem. Then the auction that uses A to choose allocations, and uses a pay-your-bid
payment scheme, has a Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy of at most c+O(c2/ec).
We also show that the small (and exponentially decreasing) loss in our price of anarchy bound
is necessary, by giving an example (for every c ≥ 2) where the resulting price of anarchy is at least
c+Ω( ce4c ).
We note that the mechanisms we consider are all prior-free. Thus, as in the full-information
case, while we assume the existence of type distributions in order to model rational agent behaviour,
our mechanism need not be aware of these distributions. In the special case that each player’s type
distribution is a point mass, Bayes-Nash equilibrium reduces to standard Nash equilibrium. Our
mechanisms therefore also preserve approximation ratios at every (mixed or pure) Nash equilibrium
of the full information game. Our analysis also extends to the more general class of coarse correlated
equilibria. For the case of pure Nash equilibrium, our price of anarchy bound improves to c.
As is standard, our bounds on the Bayesian price of anarchy will assume that agent types are
distributed independently. However, we show that a weaker bound of O(c) holds when agent types
are drawn from an arbitrary distribution over the space of all type profiles. This result applies to
greedy algorithms that are non-adaptive, as described in Section 2.4. Thus, even if agent types are
arbitrarily correlated, our mechanisms yield performance at equilibrium asymptotically matching
that of the underlying allocation algorithm.
A similar bound also applies to mechanisms that use the critical-price payment scheme, which
is a natural extension of second-price payments in single-item auctions. Such a payment scheme
charges each bidder the minimum bid at which he would have maintained his allocation. These
bounds require a standard no-overbidding assumption, which is that agents are avoid bidding more
than their value for any given subset of items.
Theorem (informal): SupposeA is a greedy c-approximate allocation rule for a combinatorial
allocation problem. Then, under the assumption that agents do not overbid, the auction that usesA
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to choose allocations, and uses a critical-price payment scheme, has a Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy
of at most c+ 1.
We also show that the extra +1 term is essentially necessary for large c, by giving an example
for every c ≥ 2 where the resulting price of anarchy is at least3 c + 1 − O(1c ). As with the first-
price results, our bounds extend to coarse correlated equilibria, and a bound of O(c) holds if agent
valuations can be correlated. Furthermore, we show that a slight modification to the mechanism
allows us to replace the no-overbidding assumption with the (conceptually weaker) assumption that
bidders avoid weakly dominated strategies.
1.2 Related Work
The seminal paper in algorithmic game theory and more specifically algorithmic mechanism design
is that of Nisan and Ronen [26]. The basic issue introduced in [26] is to reconcile the competing
demands for revenue and social welfare optimization with the need for computational efficiency
in the context of self interested (i.e. selfish) agents. The two most studied solution concepts
in algorithmic game theory are truthfulness (i.e. incentive compatability) and behavior at (all)
equilbria (i.e. the price of anarchy (POA) concept). Initial POA results for games were first
introduced to algorithmic game theory in the seminal papers by Papdimitriou [27] and Roughgarden
and Tardos [30]. Christodoulou et al. [12] initiated the study of the price of the price of anarchy
in the Bayesian setting. Whereas the emphasis of algorithmic mechanism design has been to
consider the approximations achieveable by truthful mechanisms, to the best of our knowledge, our
conference paper [22] was the first to consider this constructive aspect of mechanism design and
price of anarchy.
Since the initial conference version of this work there has been significant progress on the
understanding of the price of anarchy of mechanisms in various auction settings. Some examples
include the Generalized Second Price auction for sponsored search ads [10], simultaneous single-
item auctions [12, 19, 5, 17], and multi-unit auctions [24, 13]. A framework unifying much of this
work was proposed by Syrgkanis and Tardos [32].
Chekuri and Gamzu [11] defined “loser-independent algorithms”, and in the conference version
of our paper [22] we argued that the basic property of greedy algorithms that we were exploiting was
a multi-parameter version of loser-independence. In the first author’s thesis [21], a strengthening
of loser-independence, called strong loser-independence, was introduced to simplify the proofs and
that will be the basic property of greedy algorithms we will use in this paper. Loser-independence
is conceptually related to the concept of smoothness, which was introduced by Roughgarden [29] as
a general way to derive price of anarchy results for one shot and repeated games (without reference
to mechanisms that derive games). Loser-independence has been shown to be different from this
original notion of smoothness [21]. However, alternative notions of smoothness defined by Lucier
and Paes Leme [23] and Syrgkanis and Tardos [32] can also be used to derive results similar to our
results. In particular, Syrgkanis and Tardos use their smoothness condition to derive many price
of anarchy results for allocation mechanisms, including those derived from greedy c-approximation
algorithms. Their result for the (non correlated) mixed Bayesian and coarse correlated equilbrium
improved upon our conference results: as in our current paper, they show that the resulting price
of anarchy approaches c with a term exponentially decreasing in c. In particular, they show that
3More specifically, for any γ > 1 there is an example in which a greedy algorithm has approximation factor γ + 1
γ
and the resulting price of anarchy is at least γ + 1.
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the price of anarchy is never worse than c+ .58. As we will show in Section 3.1, our application of
strong loser-independence can be interpreted as a proof of smoothness.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Feasible Allocation Problems
We consider a setting in which there are n agents and a set M of m objects. An allocation to
agent i is a subset xi ⊆ M . A valuation function v : 2M → R assigns a value to each allocation.
We assume that valuation functions are monotone, meaning v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ M , and
normalized so that v(∅) = 0. A valuation function v is single-minded if there exists a set S ⊆ M
and a value y ≥ 0 such that for all T ⊆M,v(T ) = y if S ⊆ T and 0 otherwise. A valuation profile v
is a vector of n valuation functions, one for each agent. In general we will use boldface to represent
vectors, subscript i to denote the ith component, and subscript −i to denote all components except
i, so that v = (vi,v−i). An allocation profile x is a vector of n allocations. The goal in our social
welfare maximization problems is to choose an allocation for each agent in order to maximize the
sum of agent values.
A combinatorial allocation problem is defined by a set of feasible allocations, which is the set
of permitted allocation profiles. We further assume in combinatorial allocation problems that this
feasibility constraint is separable, meaning that if x is feasible then (∅,x−i) is also feasible4 for all
i. Note that separability is a weaker assumption than the standard downward-closure property of
packing problems, which would stipulate that if x is feasible then (yi,x−i) is also feasible for all
yi ⊆ xi. An allocation rule A assigns to each valuation profile v a feasible outcome A(v); we write
Ai(v) for the allocation to agent i. An allocation rule is component-wise monotone if it satisfies
the following property for every agent i:
If vi(S) < v˜i(S), vi(T ) = v˜i(T ) ∀T 6= S, and Ai(vi,v−i) = S, then Ai(v˜i,v−i) = S
We will tend to write A for both an allocation rule and an algorithm that implements it. We will
sometimes abuse notation and use x for an allocation rule, rather than a specific allocation.
Each agent i ∈ [n] has a private valuation function vi, his type, which defines the value he
attributes to each allocation. The social welfare obtained by allocation profile x, given type profile
v, is SW (x,v) =
∑
i vi(xi). We write SWopt(v) for maxx{SW (x,v)} and say that algorithm A is
a c approximation algorithm 5 if SW (A(v),v) ≥ 1cSWopt(v) for all v.
A type profile v and an allocation rule A for a combinatorial allocation problem define critical
values, θi(S,v−i), for any agent i and set S ⊆ M . The value θi(S,v−i) is the minimum amount
that agent i could bid on set S and still win S, assuming the other agents have profile v−i. That is,
θi(S,v−i) = inf{z : xi(z,v−i) = S}. We note that this definition of critical values holds even if it is
not the case that increasing one’s value for a set necessarily increases the probability of obtaining
that set. However, most of the mechanisms we consider in this work do satisfy this monotonicity
property, which motivates the terminology of a critical price.
4We note that the combinatorial public projects problem (CPPP) [28] is not separable.
5Our convention will be to have approximation ratios c ≥ 1.
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2.2 Mechanisms
A direct revelation mechanism M(A, P ) is composed of an allocation rule A and a payment rule
P that assigns a vector of n payments to each declared valuation profile. The mechanism proceeds
by eliciting a valuation profile d from each of the agents, called the declaration profile. It then
applies the allocation and payment rules to d to obtain an allocation and payment for each agent.
Crucially, we do not assume that d is equal to v. We will write SW (d) for SW (A(d),v) when the
allocation rule and type profile are clear from context.
We will be concerned with two different payment rules, first price and critical price. In a
first price mechanism, an agent is charged their declared bid di(S) for any allocated set S. For
notational convenience, we let M1(A) denote the mechanism using allocation rule A and the first
price payment rule. In the critical price payment rule, an agent is charged his critical value θi(S,d−i)
for any allocated set S. We will let M2(A) denote the mechanism using allocation rule A and the
critical price payment rule.
2.3 Equilibria of One-shot Auctions
The utility of agent i in mechanism M = (A, P ), given declaration profile d and type profile v,
is uvii (d) = vi(Ai(d)) − Pi(d). We will often omit the dependence on vi when it is clear from
context, and write simply ui(d). We say that declaration di weakly dominates d
′ if for all d−i,
ui(di,d−i) ≥ ui(di′,d−i), and that there exist at least one d−i for which the inequality is strict.
We consider a Bayesian setting in which the true types of the agents are not fixed, but are
rather drawn from a known probability distribution F over the set of valuation profiles. We first
assume that F = F1 × . . . × Fn is the product of independent distributions, where Fi(vi) is the
probability that agent i has type vi. (Later we will also consider correlated distributions over type
profiles.) We write SWopt(F) for Ev∼F[SWopt(v)].
A bidding strategy for agent i is a function bi that maps a type vi to a distribution over dec-
larations for agent i. We think of bi(vi) as the (randomized) bidding strategy employed by agent
i given that his true type is vi. We will abuse notation slightly and also write bi(vi) for the ran-
dom variable representing a declaration chosen from the corresponding distribution. We write
b(v) = b1(v1)× . . .× bn(vn) for the (distribution over) declaration profiles resulting from applying
the bid functions in b to type profile v. The strategy profile b forms a (mixed) Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) if, for every i ∈ [n] and every vi in the support of Fi, agent i maximizes his
expected utility by making a declaration drawn from distribution bi(vi). That is, for each agent i,
each possible type vi, and every distribution ωi
′ over declarations,
Ev−i∼F−i [ui(b(v))] ≥ Ev−i∼F−i,di∼ωi′ [ui(di,b−i(v−i))].
For a mechanism M = (A, P ), we will write SWM(F,b) to mean Ev∼F [
∑
i vi(Ai(b(v)))], the
expected social welfare given type distribution F and strategy profile b.
The (mixed) Bayesian price of anarchy (BPoA) of mechanism M is defined as
sup
F,b
SWopt(F)
SWM(F,b)
where the supremum is over all type distributions F and mixed BNE b for F. In other words, the
BPoA ofM is the worst-case ratio between the expected welfare at BNE and the expected optimal
welfare.
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We can further extend the definition of BNE to allow a correlated distribution over type pro-
files. The definition for correlated BNE and correlated Bayesian price of anarchy is then the same
as the above definitions, where we would no longer assume that F is a product of independent
distributions.
Returning to the case in which F is a product distribution, a number of special cases deserve
mention. When all type distributions are point masses (i.e., each agent’s type is determined), a BNE
is referred to as a (mixed) Nash Equilibrium (NE). The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of a mechanism
M is defined analogously to the BPoA, but with respect to fixed type profiles and mixed Nash
equilibria. It follows that the BPoA is always at least the PoA for a given mechanism. A BNE (or
NE) is called pure if its constituent bidding strategies are deterministic. In general a pure Nash
equilibrium may not exist for a given mechanism and type profile; see Appendix A.
One can generalize mixed NE by relaxing the assumption that the declaration distributions
are independent. That is, one might allow b(v) to be an arbitrary distribution over declarations,
rather than a product distribution. A distribution ω over declaration profiles is a coarse correlated
equilibrium (CCE) for type profile v if, for all i and all declaration distributions ωi
′,
Ed∼ω[ui(d)] ≥ Ed∼(ωi′,ω−i)[ui(d)]. (1)
Note that when the agent declaration distributions are independent, CCE is equivalent to mixed
NE. We define the analogous price of anarchy concepts; it follows that the pure price of anarchy is
at most the mixed price of anarchy which in turn is at most the coarse correlated price of anarchy.
2.4 Greedy Allocation Rules
We describe a special type of allocation rule, which we will refer to as a greedy allocation rule. These
are motivated by the priority framework in Borodin, Nielsen and Rackoff [7] and the monotone
greedy algorithms of Mu’alem and Nisan [25], extended to be adaptive as in Borodin and Lucier
[6]. We begin with some definitions. A partial allocation profile for agents N ⊆ [n] is an allocation
profile x with xi = ∅ for all i 6∈ N . A partial allocation profile is feasible if there is some feasible
allocation profile that extends it. Given a partial allocation profile x for subset N , some i 6∈ N , and
allocation y ⊆ M , we say y is a feasible allocation for i given N if the partial allocation remains
feasible when we set xi = y.
A priority function is a function r : [n]× 2M × R→ R. We think of r(i, S, v) as the priority of
allocating S ⊆M to player i when vi(S) = v. We say that r is monotone if it is non-decreasing in
v and monotone non-increasing in S with respect to set inclusion.
We consider two types of greedy allocation algorithms. A non-adaptive greedy allocation algo-
rithm A is an allocation algorithm as defined in Figure 1. We say that A is monotone when the
priority function r is monotone. We assume that ties in step 3 are broken in an arbitrary but fixed
manner (i.e. we assume that the priority function is a 1-1 function inducing a total ordering).
A non-adaptive algorithm fixes a single priority function that is used throughout its execution.
By constrast, an adaptive greedy allocation algorithm can change its priority function on each
iteration, depending on the partial allocation formed on the previous iterations.
2.5 Applications
We now describe some applications of greedy algorithms for particular combinatorial allocation
problems.
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Priority Algorithm
Input: Declaration profile d = d1, . . . , dn.
1. Fix a monotone priority function r. Let N = ∅.
2. Repeat until N = [n]:
3. Choose i /∈ N and feasible allocation S ⊆M for i given N that maximizes r(i, S, di(S))
4. Set xi = S; add player i to N
5. return x = (x1, . . . , xn)
Figure 1: The framework for a non-adaptive priority algorithm.
Combinatorial Auctions The general combinatorial auction problem is defined by the feasibil-
ity constraint that no two allocations can intersect. Lehmann et al [20] show that the (non-adaptive)
greedy allocation rule with r(i, S, v) = v√
|S|
achieves a
√
2m approximation ratio for CAs.
Cardinality-restricted Combinatorial Auctions In the special case that players’ desires are
restricted to sets of size at most k, the non-adaptive greedy algorithm with r(i, S, v) = v is k-
approximate assuming single-minded agents. This translates to a (k + 1) approximate algorithm
for general (i.e. multi-minded) agents.
Multiple-Demand Unsplittable Flow Problem In the unsplittable flow problem (UFP), we
are given an undirected graph with edge capacities. The objects are the edges, and each valuation
function is such that agent i has some value v(s, t) for being given a path from s to t. Each agent
additionally specifies a fractional demand di ∈ [0, 1] corresponding to a desired amount of flow to
send along the given path. An allocation is feasible if the total allocated flow along each edge is
no more than its capacity. Let B be the minimum edge capacity. A primal-dual algorithm, which
is an adaptive greedy allocation rule, obtains an O(m1/(B−1)) approximation for any B > 1 [8].
Convex Bundle Auctions In a convex bundle auction, M is the plane R2, and allocations must
be non-intersecting compact convex sets. We suppose that agents declare valuation functions by
making bids for such sets. Given such a collection of bids, the aspect-ratio, R, is defined to be
the maximum diameter of a set divided by the minimum width of a set. A non-adaptive greedy
allocation rule using a geometrically-motivated priority function yields an O(R4/3) approximation
[2]. Alternative greedy algorithms yield better approximation ratios for special cases, such as
rectangles.
Max-profit Unit Job Scheduling In this problem, each bidder has a job of unit time to
schedule on one of multiple machines. A bidder has various windows of time of the form (release
time, deadline, machine) in which his job could be scheduled, with a potentially different profit
resulting from each window. The profits and windows are private information to each bidder. The
goal of the mechanism is to schedule the jobs to maximize the total profit. The greedy algorithm
that orders bids by value obtains a 3-approximation, and is symmetric with respect to agents and
objects.
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Unlike the previous examples, for the case of single-minded bidders, there is an optimal dynamic
programming algorithm that runs in time O(n7) [3]. Since this algorithm solves the problem
optimally, it is incentive compatible. In this case, the resulting price of anarchy for the greedy
algorithm is appealing primarily due to its linear runtime and simple allocation rule.
3 Strong Loser-Independence
Chekuri and Gamzu [11] introduced a property known as loser-independence for combinatorial
allocation algorithms in single-parameter domains. They define an algorithm for a combinatorial
allocation problem to be loser-independent if, whenever Ai(di,d−i) = Ai(di′,d−i) = ∅ for some i,
d−i, di, and di
′, then it must be that A(di,d−i) = A(di′,d−i). That is, if a “losing” agent (i.e.
an agent who is allocated no items) modifies his declaration in such a way that he still receives no
items, this cannot affect the outcome of algorithm A. Note that loser-independence is a condition on
declaration profiles, rather than on bidding functions, since the loser-independence notion is purely
algorithmic and is not a condition on equilibria. In our results we will make use of a stronger
property of greedy algorithms, which we call strong loser-independence.
Definition 3.1 An allocation rule A is strongly loser-independent if, whenever d and d′ satisfy
A(d) 6= A(d′), there exists an agent i and set S 6= ∅ such that di(S) 6= di′(S) and either Ai(d) = S
or Ai(di′,d−i) = S.
Roughly speaking, if A is a strongly loser-independent algorithm, then whenever a valuation
profile changes from d to d′ via modifications to “losing bids” (i.e. an agent i’s declared value for
sets that are not allocated to him, when others bid according to d−i), algorithm A will return the
same outcome on inputs d and d′. We note that our definition requires that either Ai(d) = S or
Ai(di′,d−i) = S, rather than Ai(d′) = S. The intuition is that we think of “losing bids” as being
losers with respect to the original declaration profile d.
The property of strong loser-independence strengthens the definition of loser-independence due
to Chekuri and Gamzu in two ways. First, we extend from single-parameter settings to multiple-
parameter settings by considering losing bids rather than losing agents. Second, we require that
the algorithm outcome be unaffected if multiple agents simultaneously modify losing bids.
It is clear from the definitions that all strongly loser-independent algorithms are loser-independent
(i.e. by considering the case when d and d′ differ only on the declaration of a single agent). How-
ever, not all loser-independent algorithms are strongly loser-independent, even in single-minded
domains. For example, consider the combinatorial auction problem and suppose that A is an
algorithm that optimizes social welfare exactly and breaks ties consistently. Then A is loser-
independent, since a losing agent’s bid does not affect the optimal allocation. However, A is not
strongly loser-independent, as the following instance shows. Consider an auction of two items {a, b}
to three bidders. If the (single-minded) bidder declarations are d1({a, b}) = 10, d2({a}) = 3, and
d3({b}) = 3, then the outcome is that agent 1 wins his desired set. On the other hand, if the
bidder declarations are given by d′ where d1
′({a, b}) = 10, d2′({a}) = 6, and d3′({b}) = 6, then
the outcome changes: agents 2 and 3 win their desired sets. However, d and d′ do not differ
in their declarations for any sets allocated by A(d), A(d1′,d−i), A(d2′,d−i), or A(d3′,d−i), as
agent 1 wins his desired set in each of these four cases. This contradicts the definition of strongly
loser-independence.
As we now show, all greedy algorithms satisfy the strong loser-independence property.
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Lemma 3.2 Every (monotone) adaptive greedy algorithm is (component-wise monotone) and strongly
loser-independent.
Proof: The monotonicity property follows immediately when the priority function in the greedy
algorithm is a monotone function.
Let A be an adaptive greedy allocation rule, and choose any d and d′ such that A(d) 6= A(d′).
We will show that there exists some i and S such that di(S) 6= di′(S) and either Ai(d) = S or
Ai(di′,d−i) = S.
Recall the definition of an adaptive greedy algorithm, and consider the iterations of A on
inputs d and d′. Let k be the first iteration in which the allocation of A differs on these two inputs.
Suppose that A allocates set U to agent ℓ on iteration k when the input is d, and allocates T to
agent j on iteration k when the input is d′.
For each iteration q < k, write iq for the agent allocated to by A (on either input profile) and
Sq for the set allocated to iq. Note that if diq (Sq) 6= diq ′(Sq) for any q < k then we have the desired
result with i = iq and S = Sq. We can therefore assume that diq(Sq) = diq
′(Sq) for all q < k. This
implies that the bids resolved by A are identical on all iterations preceeding k on inputs d and d′,
and therefore the values of ranking functions used in each iteration up to k must be identical for
inputs d and d′. Write rq for the ranking function used in iteration q for each q ≤ k. Thus, since
the allocation on iteration k changed from choosing set U for agent ℓ to choosing set T for agent
j, it must be that either rk(ℓ, U, dℓ(U)) 6= rk(ℓ, U, dℓ′(U)) or rk(j, T, dj(T )) 6= rk(j, T, dj ′(T )). This
implies that either dℓ(U) 6= dℓ′(U) or dj(T ) 6= dj ′(T ).
If dℓ(U) 6= dℓ′(U) then we have the desired result with i = ℓ and S = U , since Aℓ(d) = U .
We can therefore assume that dℓ(U) = dℓ
′(U) and dj(T ) 6= dj ′(T ). Consider now the behaviour of
algorithm A on input (dj ′,d−i). We claim that Aj(dj ′,d−i) = T . Note that this implies the desired
result with i = j and S = T . To prove the claim, recall that diq (Sq) = diq
′(Sq) for all q < k. Thus,
for each q < k and each feasible set S that could be allocated to agent j on iteration q,
rq(iq, Sq, diq (Sq)) = rq(iq, Sq, diq
′(Sq)) > rq(j, S, dj
′(S))
since A allocates Sq to iq on input d′. We conclude that, on input (dj ′,d−i), A allocates Sq to
agent iq on each iteration q < k . On iteration k, we have rk(j, T, dj
′(T )) > rk(j, T
′, dj
′(T ′)) for
any feasible T ′ 6= T (since A allocates T to j on input d′) and
rk(j, T, dj
′(T )) > rk(ℓ, U, dℓ
′(U)) = rk(ℓ, U, dℓ(U)) ≥ rk(i, S, di(S))
for any feasible i 6= j, due to our assumption that dℓ′(U) = dℓ(U) and the fact that A allocates U
to ℓ on iteration k for input d. We therefore conclude that Aj(dj ′,d−i) = T as required. ✷
We next explore an implication of a strongly loser-independent algorithm A being a worst-case
c-approximation. If A is a c-approximate algorithm, then (on any input) the sum of the declared
values for its output profile approximates the sum of the declared values for the optimal allocation.
We now show that it also approximates the sum of the critical values of the optimal allocation
profile.
Lemma 3.3 If A is a c-approximate strongly loser-independent algorithm, then for any type profile
v and allocation profile y,
∑
i∈[n] vi(Ai(v)) ≥ 1c
∑
i∈[n] θi(yi,v−i).
Proof: Choose any ǫ > 0. For all i, let vi
′ be the single-minded declaration for set yi at
value θi(yi,v−i) − ǫ. Let vi∗ be the pointwise maximum of vi′ and vi. That is, for all S ⊆ M ,
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vi
∗(S) = max{vi(S), vi ′(S)}. By definition of critical prices, we have that Ai(vi∗,v−i) = Ai(v)
for all i, and furthermore vi
∗(Ai(v)) = vi(Ai(v)). Since A is strongly loser-independent, we must
therefore have A(v) = A(v∗). Since A is a c-approximation, we conclude that SW (x(v),v) =
SW (x(v∗),v∗) ≥ 1cSW (y,v∗) ≥ 1c
∑
i∈[n] θi(yi,v−i)− nǫ. The result follows by taking the limit as
ǫ→ 0. ✷
For brevity, for the remainder of this paper we will say “monotone strongly loser-independent”
to mean both strongly loser-independent and component-wise monotone6.
3.1 Applying Strong Loser Independence
Strong loser-independence is a strictly algorithmic concept, devoid of game theoretic considerations.
Our general approach will be to derive price of anarchy results for any mechanism that uses a
strongly loser-independent c-approximation A as its allocation algorithm. To do so, we will be
using Lemma 3.3 in conjuction with the assumption that a given bid profile is an equilibrium.
At a high level, our argument will be as follows. For each pricing rule and equilibrium concept,
equilibrium will imply an inequality of the form
vi(yi) ≤ λ · θi(yi,d−i) + µ · vi(xi(d))
where y is an optimal allocation. (For Bayesian equilibrium, these terms will be expectations.)
This allows us to charge the optimal gain for each agent to its critical value and its welfare from
the algorithm. We then exploit Lemma 3.3 to convert this bound into a relationship between the
optimal welfare and the welfare at equilibrium. To make this more specific, in our pure Nash
equilibrium result for a first price mechanism (Theorem 4.3), we show the following (somewhat
stronger) inequality:
vi(yi) ≤ θi(yi,d−i) + vi(xi(d))− di(xi(d))
It will then follow (ignoring an nǫ term which disappears as ǫ→ 0) that:∑
i
vi(yi) ≤
∑
i
θi(yi,d−i) +
∑
i
vi(xi(d))−
∑
i
di(xi(d))
≤ (c− 1)
∑
i
di(xi(d)) +
∑
i
vi(xi(d))
In other words, the high-level approach is to charge an agent’s welfare in the optimal outcome
against his welfare at equilibrium plus the welfare of other “price-setting” agents. This approach is
similar to the smoothness argument as formulated by Syrgkanis and Tardos [32]. However, there is a
difference in our approaches. The smoothness condition in [32] is tailored to allocation mechanisms
and asserts the existence of some di (for each player i) satisfying such an inequality whereas we
are assuming that d is an equilibrium. The benefit of their immediate reduction to smoothness is
that their price of anarchy results for pure equilibria carry over immediately to Bayesian price of
anarchy. However, this prohibits establishing certain tight bounds; for example, in the first price
mechanism we show that the pure price of anarchy is c, which cannot be achieved via smoothness
since this bound does not hold for the Bayesian price of anarchy.
6For pure Nash equlibirium price of anarchy results, if we assume no over-bidding, we do not need monotonicity
but it is necessary for all of our other results.
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4 First-Price Mechanisms
In this section we analyze greedy algorithms paired with a first price payment scheme. More
precisely (with the exception of results relating to correlated Bayesian equilibirium where we will
consider more specific greedy allocations), given a strongly loser-independent algorithm A, we will
be studying the performance of the first-price mechanism M1(A) at equilibrium.
Our first step will be to show that a utility-maximizing declaration of an agent never involves
overbidding on a set that he may possibly be allocated. This will imply that agents do not employ
overbidding strategies at equilibrium. It may appear at first glance that any strategy that recom-
mends overbidding on sets is obviously dominated for any allocation algorithm, since winning any
bid larger than one’s true value leads to negative utility. However, we must also show that an agent
cannot find it advantageous to overbid on some set S in order to affect his probability of winning
some other set T . We will demonstrate that such situations cannot occur when allocations are
chosen by a strongly loser independent algorithm.
For a type vi and a declaration di, we will write di for the declaration defined as di(S) =
min{vi(S), di(S)}. That is, di agrees with di, except that the declared value of each set can be at
most the true value for that set. Note that di = di precisely if di does not overbid on any set.
We now show that any declaration di that overbids on a set that could potentially be won is
weakly dominated by strategy di.
Lemma 4.1 For any monotone strongly loser independent allocation rule A, valuation vi, and dec-
laration profile d, we have ui(d) ≤ ui(di,d−i). Moreover, the inequality is strict when di(A(d)) >
vi(A(d)).
Proof: Let S = Ai(d). Suppose first that di(S) > vi(S). Then ui(d) = vi(S) − di(S) < 0. Since
vi(T )− di(T ) ≥ 0 for every set T , this implies that ui(di,d−i) > ui(d), as required.
Next suppose that di(S) ≤ vi(S), so that di(S) = di(S). We claim that Ai(di,d−i) = S.
Suppose not, for contradiction. Then we can construct a sequence of declarations (d1, d2, . . . , dk),
with d1 = di and d
k = di, such that adjacent declarations differ only on a single set and declared
values only decrease. Suppose j is minimal such that Ai(dj ,d−i) 6= S; such a j > 1 must exist
since, by assumption, Ai(di,d−i) 6= S. Then (a) dj−1 and dj differ only on the value assigned
to some set T , (b) dj−1(T ) > di
j(T ), (c) Ai(dj−1,d−i) = S, and (d) Ai(dj ,d−i) 6= S. Strong
loser-independence then implies that Ai(dj ,d−i) = T . However, the fact that dj−1(T ) > dj(T )
then contradicts the component-wise monotonicity of A.
We conclude by contradiction that Ai(di,d−i) = S. Since S is also A(d), we have ui(d) =
vi(S)− di(S) = ui(di,d−i) as required.
✷
An immediate corollary is that if bi is a bidding strategy, and there exists a type vi and set
S such that (bi(vi))(S) > vi(S), then bi is weakly dominated by the strategy bi. Moreover, bi is
strictly better, in terms of utility, under any distribution of declarations in which agent i wins set
S with positive probability. We conclude that at any BNE of mechanism M1(A), no player will
overbid on a set that he wins with positive probability.
Corollary 4.2 For any monotone strongly loser independent allocation rule A, BNE b, type vi,
and set S, if Prv−i∼F−i [Ai(b(v)) = S] > 0 then (bi(vi))(S) ≤ vi(S).
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4.1 Pure Nash Equilibria
We are now ready to bound the price of anarchy of M1(A). We begin with a result for pure Nash
equilibria, rather than the fully general BNE case.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose A is a c-approximate monotone strongly loser independent allocation rule
for a combinatorial allocation problem. Then the price of anarchy of M1(A) is at most c.
Proof: Fix type profile v and suppose that b forms a pure Nash equilibrium. Since the Nash
equilibrium is pure, we will write d = b(v) for notational convenience. Let y be an optimal
allocation for v, and let x(·) denote the allocation rule for A. Lemma 3.3 implies
∑
i
di(xi(d)) ≥ 1
c
∑
i
θi(yi,d−i). (2)
Choose arbitrarily small ǫ > 0 and let di
′ be the single-minded declaration for set yi at value
θi(yi,d−i)+ǫ. Then xi(di
′,d−i) = yi (from the definition of critical values) and hence ui(di
′,d−i) =
vi(yi)− θi(yi,d−i)− ǫ. Since d is a Nash equilibrium, it must be that
vi(yi)− θi(yi,d−i)− ǫ = ui(di′,d−i)
≤ ui(di,d−i)
= vi(xi(d))− di(xi(d)).
Summing over all i and applying (2) and Corollary 4.2 we have∑
i
vi(yi) ≤
∑
i
θi(yi,d−i)−
∑
i
di(xi(d)) +
∑
i
vi(xi(d)) + nǫ
≤ (c− 1)
∑
i
di(xi(d)) +
∑
i
vi(xi(d)) + nǫ
≤ c
∑
i
vi(xi(d)) + nǫ
which, taking ǫ→ 0, implies
SW (x(d),v) =
∑
i
vi(xi(d))
≥ 1
c
∑
i
vi(yi)
=
1
c
SWOPT (v)
as required. ✷
The power of Theorem 4.3 is marred by the fact that, for some problem instances, the mechanism
M1(A) is not guaranteed to have a pure Nash equilibrium. An example is given in Appendix A.
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4.2 Bayes-Nash Equilibria
We are now ready to bound the mixed Bayesian price of anarchy for mechanism M1(A).
Theorem 4.4 Suppose A is a monotone strongly loser independent allocation rule for a combina-
torial allocation problem. Then the Bayesian price of anarchy of M1(A) is at most7 c1−e−c for
every independent type distribution F.
We note that c1−e−c ≤ c
(
1 + 2ec
)
= c+ O(c/ec). The remainder of this subsection is dedicated
to the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Fix a product distribution F over type profiles and let b(·) be a (possibly mixed) Bayes-Nash
equilibrium with respect to F. Choose some type declaration v and let yv denote an optimal
allocation for v. Following the proof of Theorem 4.3, we would like to bound the expected value of
θi(y
v
i ,d−i) with respect to vi(y
v
i ) and ui(b(v)) for each i. We encapsulate this bound in Lemma
4.6 and Corollary 4.7, below. This will allow us to use Lemma 3.3 to obtain a relation between the
expected welfare of A and the expected optimal welfare; this relationship is given in Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.5 Suppose that A is a c-approximate monotone strongly loser independent allocation
rule and that there exist constants γ ≥ 0 and σi ∈ [0, c] for i ∈ [n] such that, whenever b is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium for M1(A), it is the case that for all i, all vi, and all S ⊆M ,
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥ γvi(S)− σiEv−i [ui(b(v))].
Then Ev[SW (A(b(v)),v)] ≥ γcEv[SWOPT (v)].
Lemma 4.6 Suppose that b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for mechanism M1(A) and distribution
F. Then for all i, all vi, and all S ⊆M ,
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥ vi(S)−
(
1 + ln
vi(S)
Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
)
Ev−i [ui(b(v))].
Before proving Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6, let us show how they imply Theorem 4.4. We first note
the following simple corollary of Lemma 4.6.
Corollary 4.7 Suppose that b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for mechanismM1(A) and distribution
F. Then for all i, all vi, and all S ⊆M ,
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥ (1− e−c) · vi(S)− c ·Ev−i [ui(b(v))].
Proof: Fix agent i. By Lemma 4.6, we know
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥ vi(S)−
(
1 + ln
vi(S)
Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
)
Ev−i [ui(b(v))]. (3)
7 In the initial conference version of this work, we presented a bound of c+O(log c) on the BPOA. Subsequently,
this bound was independently improved by Lucier [21] to c+O(c2/ec) and by Syrgkanis and Tardos [32] to c+O(c/ec).
We present here a slightly modifiied version of the argument from Lucier [21], which yields the improved Syrgkanis
and Tardos [32] bound of c+O(c/ec).
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Note that if
(
1 + ln vi(S)
Ev−i
[ui(b(v))]
)
≤ c then (3) immediately implies the desired result. We can
therefore assume otherwise, and choose α > 0 such that(
1 + ln
vi(S)
Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
)
= c+ α.
Rearranging, we get that vi(S) = e
α · ec−1 · Ev−i [ui(b(v))]. Applying these two equalities to (3),
we have
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥ vi(S)− (c+ α) ·Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
= vi(S)− α
eα
· vi(S)
ec−1
− c ·Ev−i [ui(b(v))].
Since αeα achieves its maximum value of 1/e at α = 1, we can conclude that
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥ vi(S)−
1
ec
· vi(S)− c ·Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
as required. ✷
Theorem 4.4 follows directly from Corollary 4.7 and Lemma 4.5. We next complete the proof
of Theorem 4.4 by proving Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6.
Proof of Lemma 4.5 : Fix distribution F over type profiles and let b(·) be a (possibly mixed)
Bayes-Nash equilibrium with respect to F. Choose some type declaration v and let yv denote an
optimal allocation for v. We know that for all i ∈ [n] and v,
Ev′−i [θi(y
v
i ,b−i(v
′
−i))] ≥ γvi(yvi )− σiEv′−i [ui(bi(vi),b−i(v
′
−i)))].
Note the distinction between v′−i, over which we are taking expectations, and v−i, which is the
type profile fixed to define yvi . Now, summing over i and taking expectation over all choices of v,
we have
Ev
[∑
i
Ev′−i [θi(y
v
i ,b−i(v
′
−i))]
]
≥ γEv
[∑
i
vi(y
v
i )
]
−Ev
[∑
i
σiEv′−i [ui(bi(vi),b−i(v
′
−i))]
]
. (4)
We now consider each of the three terms in (4). First, note that
Ev
[∑
i
vi(y
v
i )
]
= Ev[SWOPT (v)]. (5)
Additionally,
Ev
[∑
i
σiEv′−i [ui(bi(vi),b−i(v
′
−i))]
]
=
∑
i
σiEv,v′−i[ui(bi(vi),b−i(v
′
−i))]
= Ev
[∑
i
σiui(b(v))
]
= Ev
[∑
i
σivi(xi(b(v)))
]
−Ev,d=b(v)
[∑
i
σidi(xi(b(v)))
]
(6)
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where the final equality follows from the fact that our mechanism employs a first price payment
scheme. Finally,
Ev
[∑
i
Ev′−i [θi(y
v
i ,b−i(v
′
−i))]
]
= Ev,v′
[∑
i
θi(y
v
i ,b−i(v
′
−i))
]
(type independence)
≤ cEv,v′,d′=b(v′)
[∑
i
di
′(xi(d
′))
]
(Lemma 3.3)
= cEv,d=b(v)
[∑
i
di(xi(d))
]
(7)
Where the final equality follows from a change of variables, since v does not appear inside the
expectation on the previous line. Substituting (5), (6), and (7) into (4), we conclude that
cEv
[∑
i
di(xi(d))
]
≥ γEv[SWOPT (v)] −Ev
[∑
i
σivi(xi(b(v)))
]
+Ev,d=b(v)
[∑
i
σidi(xi(b(v)))
]
and hence
γEv[SWOPT (v)] ≤ Ev
[∑
i
σivi(xi(b(v)))
]
+Ev,d=b(v)
[∑
i
(c− σi)di(xi(d))
]
≤ Ev
[∑
i
σivi(xi(b(v)))
]
+Ev
[∑
i
(c− σi)vi(xi(b(v)))
]
= Ev
[∑
i
cvi(xi(b(v)))
]
= cEv[SW (A(b(v)),v)]
where in the second inequality we used Corollary 4.2 plus the fact that (c − σi) ≥ 0 for all i.
Rearranging yields
Ev[SW (A(b(v)),v)] ≥ γ
c
Ev[SWOPT (v)]
as required. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.6 : Fix any i, vi, and S. Since θi(S,d−i) ≥ 0 for all d−i, we have that
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥
∫ vi(S)
0
Pr[θi(S,b−i(v−i)) > z]dz
= vi(S)−
∫ vi(S)
0
Pr[θi(S,b−i(v−i)) ≤ z]dz.
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Recall that bi(vi) must maximize the expected utility of agent i. Choose any z ≥ 0 and consider
the alternative strategy di which places a single-minded bid of z on set S. Then since bi(vi) is an
optimal strategy, we have that
Ev−i [ui(b(v))] ≥ Ev−i [ui(di,b−i(v−i))]
= (vi(S)− z) Pr[θi(S,b−i(v−i)) ≤ z]
where the equality follows since any single minded bid above the critical value for S insures that S
will be won, as a consequence of monotonicity. We conclude that
Pr[θi(S,b−i(v−i)) ≤ z] ≤
Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
(vi(S)− z)
for all 0 ≤ z < vi(S). We also know that Pr[θi(S,b−i(v−i)) ≤ z] ≤ 1 for all z. Write r =
vi(S)−Ev−i [ui(b(v))]. We then conclude that
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥ vi(S)−
∫ r
0
Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
(vi(S)− z) dz −
∫ vi(S)
r
1dz
= vi(S)−Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
∫ vi(S)
Ev−i
[ui(b(v))]
1
y
dy −Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
= vi(S)−
(
1 + ln
vi(S)
Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
)
Ev−i [ui(b(v))]
as required. ✷
Corollary 4.8 (of proof) The same bound on price of anarchy applies to coarse correlated equilib-
rium.
Proof: That such price of anarchy bounds can be applied to coarse correlated equlibria in the
full information setting was initially observed by Roughgarden [29]. Specifically, in the proof of
Theorem 4.4, all occurences of Ev,d=b(v) can be replaced by Ed∼(di′,ω−i), resulting in a bound on
the coarse correlated PoA. ✷
It may be tempting to conjecture that the (exponentially small) loss in approximation factor in
Theorem 4.4 is simply an artifact of the analysis, and that the Bayesian price of anarchy ofM1(A)
is actually c. However, we now show by way of an example that this loss is necessary; that is, there
exist instances in which the mixed price of anarchy (and hence the Bayesian price of anarchy) is
strictly greater than c.
Proposition 4.9 For any c ≥ 2, there is a combinatorial allocation problem P and a non-adaptive
greedy algorithm A such that A is a c-approximation for P, and the mixed price of anarchy for
M1(A) is at least c+ c2/e4c = c+Ω(c2/e4c).
Proof: We begin by describing our combinatorial allocation problem. We choose a parameter
k > c that will be fixed later. Our auction has ck + k objects, which we label aij for i ∈ [k], j ∈ [c]
and bi for i ∈ [k]. There are 4k agents, labelled Ai, Bi, Ci, and Di for i ∈ [k]. Our feasibility
constraints are as follows. Each agent Bi or Ci can receive only set {ai1} or ∅. Each agent Di can
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receive set {ai1, ak1} or ∅. Each agent Ai can receive either set {ai1, ai2, . . . , aic}, set {bi}, or ∅.
Under these restrictions, an allocation is feasible if each object is assigned to at most one agent.
Let A be the non-adaptive greedy algorithm that orders bids by density: i.e. with priority
function r(i, S, v) = v/|S| when S is a feasible set for agent i. We claim that when c ≥ 2, this
algorithm obtains a c-approximation for the above combinatorial auction. To see this, note that
the (unique) set that can be allocated to any agent Bi, Ci, or Di intersects sets of size at most c
times larger, so if the greedy algorithm allocates to one of these agents for a value of v, the total
value of intersecting sets in the optimal solution is at most cv. On the other hand, if the greedy
algorithm allocates {bi} to agent Ai, this conflicts only with the allocation of set {ai1, . . . , aic} to
agent Ai, which again has value at most c times greater. Finally, suppose that the greedy algorithm
allocates set {ai1, . . . , aic} to agent Ai, say with value vc (i.e. value density v). This allocation can
conflict only with a single allocation to an agent Bi, Ci, or Di plus an allocation of {bi} to agent
Ai, which comprises a total of at most 3 objects. Since the greedy algorithm allocates by density,
the total value of the conflicted bids is at most 3v. Since c ≥ 2, we conclude that the allocation of
{ai1, . . . , aic} to agent Ai is within a factor of c of the value of any intersecting sets in the optimal
allocation.
Consider now the following instance of this problem, specified by the following agent types.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, agent Ai desires {ai1, ai2, . . . , aic} for value k − i and {bi} for value 0.
• Agent Ak desires {ak1, ak2, . . . , akc} for value k and {bk} for value 1.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, agents Bi and Ci both desire set {ai1} for value (k − i)/c.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, agent Di desires set {ai1, ak1} for value 2(k − i)/c.
Note that agent Ak has a value density of k/c for the desired set {ak1, . . . , akc}, and each agent Ai
with i < k has value density (k− i)/c for desired set {ai1, . . . , aic}. Also, the agents Bi, Ci, and Di
have a value density of (k − i)/c for their desired sets.
We will suppose that A applies the following fixed tie-breaking rules. For any i, A will break a
tie between agents Ai, Bi, Ci, and/or Di first in favour of Di, then in favour of Bi, then Ai. We can
also assume that A breaks ties between multiple desired sets for agent Ai in favour of {bi}. Finally,
A will favour allocating non-empty sets over allocating the empty set (e.g., if an agent declares the
zero valuations).
We now describe a mixed Nash equilibrium for this problem instance. Each agent Ai declares the
zero valuation. Each agent Bi and Ci declares his valuation truthfully. Each agent Di will declare
his valuation truthfully with some probability pi, and will otherwise declare the zero valuation. We
choose pi =
1
i+1 .
What is the outcome when agents bid in this way? First, each agent Ai is allocated set {bi}
(due to our assumed tie-breaking). For the items aij, only items with j = 1 will be allocated. For
i < k, if agents D1, . . . ,Di−1 declare the zero allocation and Di does not, then object a1i will be
allocated to Di. If not, then item a1i will be allocated to agent Bi. Item ak1 will be allocated to
Di where i is the smallest such that Di does not declare the zero valuation, or Bk if D1, . . . ,Dk all
declare the zero valuation.
We now argue that this distribution of declarations is indeed a mixed Nash equilibrium. With
probability 1, no agent Bi, Ci, or Di can obtain positive utility from any declaration (since their
desired sets conflict with other bids of the same value density), so their distributions over declara-
tions that obtain utility 0 are necessarily optimal. Furthermore, for each i < k, agent Ai cannot
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obtain positive utility so his bidding strategy is also optimal. Agent Ak obtains utility 1; his only
hope for obtaining more utility is to declare a value less than k− 1 for set {ak1, . . . , akc}. However,
if he declares some value k − z with z > 1, say with x = ⌈z⌉, then he can win his desired set only
if bidders D1, . . . ,Dx−1 all bid the zero valuation, since otherwise an agent Dj with j < x would
win his desired set, blocking the bid by agent Ak. The probability that bidders D1, . . . ,Dx−1 all
declare the zero valuation is 12
2
3 · · · x−1x = 1x ≤ 1z . Thus, for any z, agent Ak can obtain utility z
with probability at most 1/z, for an expected utility of at most 1. The given declaration by agent
Ak is therefore optimal.
We will now bound the social efficiency of this equilibrium. The optimal obtainable welfare is
k+
∑k−1
i=1 (k− i) = 12k(k+1), by allocating set {ai1, . . . , aic} to agent Ai for all i. In the equilibrium
we’ve described, object bk is allocated to agent Ak for a value of 1 and each object ai1 for i < k
is allocated to either Bi or Di at a per-item value of (k − i)/c. For each i < k, object a1k will
be allocated to bidder Di precisely if bidders D1, . . . ,Dj−1 declare the zero valuation but Di does
not, which occurs with probability 1i(i+1) . Object a1k will be allocated to either Bk or Dk with the
remaining probability, which is 1k . Noting that each of Bi and Di has a per-item value of (k − i)/c
for their desired sets, we conclude that the expected total value obtained is
1 +
∑
i<k
k − i
c
+
∑
i<k
1
i(i+ 1)
· k − i
c
+
1
k
· k − k
c
=1 +
1
c
[
1
2
(k2 − k) + k −
∑
i<k
1
i+ 1
− 1
]
=1 +
1
c
[
1
2
(k2 + k)−Hk
]
where Hk is the kth harmonic number.
We conclude that the mixed price of anarchy for this mechanism is at least
1
2(k
2 + k)
1 + 1c
[
1
2(k
2 + k)−Hk
] > c( k2 + k
k2 + k + 2c− 2 ln k
)
where we used the fact that Hk > ln k. Choose k = e
2c. Then our mechanism has mixed price of
anarchy at least
c
(
e4c + e2c
e4c + e2c − 2c
)
> c
(
e4c
e4c − c
)
> c
(
1 +
c
e4c
)
as required. ✷
4.3 Correlated Types
Recall that our bound for Bayesian Price of Anarchy required that agent types be distributed
independently. We now provide an alternative (weaker) bound that holds even if agent types are
arbitrarily correlated. The key to the new analysis is in considering a deviating behaviour for each
agent that does not depend on the other agents’ types. The particular deviation we will consider
is that of bidding half of one’s true value for every set. Our analysis will additionally require that
the underlying allocation algorithm is a fixed order greedy algorithm.
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Theorem 4.10 Suppose A is a c-approximate non-adaptive greedy algorithm for a combinatorial
allocation problem. Then M1(A) has Correlated Bayesian Price of Anarchy at most 4c, for any
type distribution F.
The key to this result lies in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11 Suppose A is a c-approximate non-adaptive greedy algorithm for a combinatorial
allocation problem. Then for all type profiles v and all strategy profiles b(·),
∑
i
ui(vi/2,b−i(v−i)) ≥ 1
2c
SWOPT (v)− SW (A(b(v)),v).
Proof: Let y denote the optimal allocation for type profile v. Choose agent i, and consider
the outcome of A on input profile (vi/2,b−i(v−i)). Let xi = Ai(vi/2,b−i(v−i)). Note that it
must either be that θi(yi,b−i(v−i)) ≥ 12vi(yi) or not. In the latter case, agent i must obtain some
allocation xi with r(i, xi, vi(xi)/2) ≥ r(i, yi, vi(xi)/2). Since A is a non-adaptive greedy algorithm,
this then implies that vi(xi) ≥ 1cvi(yi), since otherwise A would obtain less than a 1c fraction of
the optimal social welfare on the input in which agent i places bids only on sets xi and yi, and all
other agents bid 0.
We conclude that for all i, either θi(yi,b−i(v−i)) >
1
2vi(yi) or else vi(xi) ≥ 1cvi(yi). Let
N = {i | θi(yi,b−i(v−i)) > 12vi(yi)} be the set of agents for which the former condition holds. We
then note that∑
i∈N
1
2
vi(yi) <
∑
i∈N
θi(yi,b−i(v−i)) ≤ cSW (A(b(v)),b(v)) ≤ cSW (A(b(v)),v)
where the second inequality is due to Lemma 3.3 and the third is due to Lemma 4.1. Furthermore,
since vi(xi) ≥ 1cvi(yi) for all i 6∈ N , we have∑
i 6∈N
1
2
vi(yi) ≤
∑
i 6∈N
c
2
vi(xi(vi/2,b−i(v−i))) ≤ c
∑
i
ui(vi/2,b−i(v−i))
where the second inequality follows because we are using the first-price payment scheme. Combining
these inequalities yields
∑
i
ui(vi/2,b−i(v−i)) + SW (A(b(v)),v) ≥ 1
2c
SWOPT (v)
as required. ✷
Theorem 4.10 now follows easily from Lemma 4.11. Recall that Lemma 4.11 holds for all
strategy profiles, not just strategies in equlibrium. If we take b to be an equilibrium profile under
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type distribution F, then
Ev[SW (A(b(v)),v)] ≥ Ev
[∑
i
ui(b(v))
]
=
∑
i
EviEv−i|vi [ui(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))]
≥
∑
i
EviEv−i|vi
[
ui
(vi
2
,b−i(v−i)
)]
= Ev
[∑
i
ui
(vi
2
,b−i(v−i)
)]
≥ Ev
[
1
2c
∑
i
SWOPT (v) − SW (A(b(v)),v)
]
(Lemma 4.11)
from which we conclude that
Ev[SW (A(b(v)),v)] ≥ 1
4c
Ev
[∑
i
OPT (v)
]
completing the proof of Theorem 4.10.
5 Critical-Price Mechanisms
We begin by studying the performance of critical (i.e. second) price mechanisms at equilibrium. The
mechanism we study is M2(A), which is defined with respect to an arbitrary monotone strongly
loser-independent algorithm A. Recall thatM2(A) proceeds by first collecting a declaration profile
from the agents, then passing the observed declarations to A as input. The mechanism returns the
allocation provided by A as output, and charges each agent his critical value for the set received
(computed via additional calls to A; see Section 5.4).
We will show that every Bayes-Nash equilibria of M2(A) has a social welfare guarantee nearly
matching that of the original algorithm A. This result requires that we make an assumption on the
bidding strategies applied by the users; namely, that they do not overbid, meaning that they do
not bid more than their true value on any given set S. This overbidding assumption is necessary
to exclude certain degenerate equilibria, such as one agent making an infinitely large bid on the
set of all objects and other bidders bidding 0. We note that such assumptions are reasonable in
general; even the truthful Vickrey auction of a single item requires a no-overbidding assumption
to bound the efficiency of the outcome at equilibrium. In Section 5.3 we discuss ways to relax this
assumption by modifying the mechanism slightly.
5.1 Bayes-Nash Equilibria
We begin by analyzing the Bayesian price of anarchy for the critical price mechanism M2(A).
Given that agents will not overbid, a simple modification of Theorem 4.4 yields a result for BNE
under critical prices.
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Theorem 5.1 Suppose A is a c-approximate monotone strongly loser independent allocation rule,
and that b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium ofM2(A) in which agents do not overbid. Then the expected
welfare when agents declare according to b is a (c+1)-approximation to the expected optimal welfare.
Lemma 5.2 Suppose that b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for mechanism M2(A) and distribution
F. Then for all i, all vi, and all S ⊆M ,
Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))] ≥ vi(S)−Ev−i [vi(xi(bi(vi),b−i(v−i)))]
Proof: Choose any i, vi, and S. Let di be a single-minded declaration for set S at value vi(S),
and consider a strategy under which agent i declares di when his type is vi. Under this strategy,
the expected utility of agent i with type vi is
Ev−i [ui(di,b−i(v−i))] ≥ Ev−i [max{vi(S)− θi(S,b−i(v−i)), 0}]
≥ vi(S)−Ev−i [θi(S,b−i(v−i))].
(8)
Since bi is an equilibrium strategy for agent i, it must be that
Ev−i [ui(di,b−i(v−i))] ≤ Ev−i [ui(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))]
≤ Ev−i [vi(xi(bi(vi),b−i(v−i)))].
(9)
Combining equations (8) and (9) leads to the desired result. ✷
Following the proof of Theorem 4.4, we conclude that for all equilibria b, if we write yv for an
optimal allocation for any given type profile v, then
Ev
[∑
i
Ev′−i [θi(y
v
i ,b−i(v
′
−i))]
]
≥ Ev
[∑
i
vi(y
v
i )
]
−Ev
[∑
i
Ev′−i [vi(xi(bi(vi),b−i(v
′
−i)))]
]
.
(10)
Just as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, we obtain the bounds
Ev
[∑
i
vi(y
v
i )
]
= Ev[SWOPT (v)],
Ev
[∑
i
Ev′−i [vi(xi(bi(vi),b−i(v
′
−i)))]
]
= Ev[SW (A(b(v)),v)],
Ev
[∑
i
Ev′−i [θi(y
v
i ,b−i(v
′
−i))]
]
≤ cEv[SW (A(b(v)),v)]
which, taken together with (10), completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. Note that when deriving the
last inequality above, we do not invoke Lemma 4.1 (as in the proof of Theorem 4.4); instead, we
use the assumption that agents do not overbid. ✷
In precisely the same way as for the first-price mechanism, the bound on the price of anarchy
also extends to coarse correlated equilibrium.
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Corollary 5.3 (of proof) The bound of (c + 1) on the price of anarchy applies also to coarse
correlated equilibrium.
We next show that this gap between the approximation factor of the original algorithm and
the price of anarchy of the critical price mechanism is required for large c. For any c ≥ 1 we
exhibit a combinatorial allocation problem and a non-adaptive greedy algorithm A such that the
approximation factor of A is c+ 1c but the (pure) price of anarchy of M2(A) is c+1. This leads us
to conclude that, in general, the bound in Theorem 5.1 cannot be improved beyond c+ 1−O(1c ).
Proposition 5.4 For any c ≥ 1, there is a combinatorial allocation problem P and a non-adaptive
greedy algorithm A such that A is a (c+ 1c )-approximation for P, and the pure price of anarchy for
M2(A) is c+ 1.
Proof: Consider a combinatorial auction problem with two objects a, b and two players, under the
restriction that each player can be allocated at most one object and player 2 cannot be allocated
object b. Algorithm A will be a non-adaptive greedy algorithm defined by the following ranking
function: r(1, {a}, v) = v, r(1, {b}, v) = c · v, and r(2, {a}, v) = 1c · v where ties are broken in favor
of r(1, {a}, v). As a result of this ranking function and greediness, it follows that if v1(a) ≥ cv1(b)
and v1(a) ≥ 1cv2(a) then a is allocated to player 1 and ∅ to player 2; otherwise b is allocated to
player 1 and a to player 2.
Note that this is a c+ 1c approximation algorithm, since whenever the algorithm allocates a to
player 1 we have v2(a) + v1(b) ≤ (c + 1c )v1(a), and whenever the algorithm allocates a to player 2
we have v1(a) ≤ c(v1(b) + v2(a)). In either case, the algorithm’s allocation has social welfare that
is at least a (c+ 1c ) fraction of the other alternative.
Consider the mechanism M2(A), and suppose that the agents have a type profile in which
v1(a) = v1(b) = 1 and v2(a) = c. Then the declaration profile d1(a) = 1, d1(b) = 0, and d2(a) = 0
is in equilibrium, since agent 1 cannot improve upon his utility of 1 and agent 2 cannot affect
the outcome without paying at least θ2(a, d1) = c, for a utility of 0. The social welfare at this
equilibrium is 1, but a total of c+1 is possible by allocating a to player 2 and allocating b to player
1. Thus the price of anarchy for M2(A) is at least c+ 1. ✷
5.2 Correlated Types
Theorem 5.1 requires that agent types be distributed independently. As with the first-price mech-
anism, we can provide a somewhat weaker bound that holds even when agent types are arbitrarily
correlated. And as in Theorem 5.1 this result additionally requires that the underlying allocation
algorithm is a non-adaptive greedy algorithm.
Theorem 5.5 Suppose A is a c-approximate non-adaptive greedy algorithm for a combinatorial
allocation problem, and that agents do not overbid. Then M2(A) has Correlated Bayesian Price of
Anarchy at most 4c, for any type distribution F.
The proof of Theorem 5.5 follows that of Theorem 4.10 almost exactly. The sole difference is
that the invocation of Lemma 4.1 in the proof of Theorem 4.10 is replaced by an appeal to the
no-overbidding assumption. We omit the details for brevity.
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5.3 Overbidding and Restricted Expressiveness
Our analysis to this point made use of a no-overbidding assumption, which states that no agent
will place a bid larger than her true value on any given set. However, our use of the no-overbidding
assumption is marred by the fact that a restriction to no-overbidding strategies is not always rational
when agents have complete confidence about their opponents’ type distributions. As the following
example shows, an agent may be strictly better off by overbidding, even in a full-information setting.
In other words, a strategy with overbidding is not necessarily dominated.
Example 5.6 Consider a combinatorial auction with 3 objects, {a, b, c}, and 3 bidders, under the
feasibility restriction that each agent can be allocated at most one object. Let A be the greedy
algorithm that orders bids by value. Suppose the types of the players are as follows: t1(b) = 2,
t1(c) = 4, t2(c) = 3, t3(a) = 1, t3(b) = 6, and all other values are 0. Consider the following bidding
strategies for agents 2 and 3: bidder 2 declares truthfully with probability 1, and bidder 3 either
declares single-mindedly for a with value 1, or single-mindedly for b with value 6, each with equal
probability.
How should agent 1 declare to maximize utility? We can limit our analysis to pure strategies
(as any optimal randomized strategy has only optimal strategies in its support). Suppose agent 1
does not overbid and declares at most 2 for object b. If he also declares at least 3 for object c, then
he wins c with probability 1 for an expected utility of 1. If he doesn’t declare at least 3 for object
c, then he wins b with probability 1/2 and nothing otherwise, again for an expected utility of 1. So
agent 1 can gain a utility of at most 1 if he does not overbid. If, however, he declares 5 for b and
4 for c, then he wins b with probability 1/2 and wins c otherwise, for an expected utility of 3/2. If
agent 1 bids in this way, the resulting combination of strategies forms a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Thus, in mixed equilibria, an agent may strictly improve his utility by overbidding.
We now show that if we modify mechanism M2(A) by effectively limiting the expressiveness of
the bids made by the agents, then we obtain the same efficiency bounds at equilibria but furthermore
guarantee that any bidding strategy that involves overbidding is dominated. Thus, as long as
agents avoid dominated strategies (a very mild assumption), all equilibria of rational play lead to
approximately efficient outcomes.
For a monotone strongly loser independent allocation rule A, the modified mechanism M∗2(A)
is as described in Figure 2. Mechanism M∗2(A) proceeds by first simplifying the declaration given
by each agent, then passing the simplified declarations to algorithm A. The resulting allocation is
paired with a payment scheme that charges critical prices.
The simplification process SIMPLIFY essentially converts any declaration into a single-minded
declaration (and does not affect declarations that are already single-minded). We can therefore
assume without loss of generality that agents always make single-minded declarations to this mech-
anism, as additional information is not used.8
Fix a particular combinatorial auction problem and type profile v, and let A be an arbitrary
strongly loser-independent approximation algorithm. Since v is fixed, we can think of a strategy
for each agent i as a declaration di ∈ Vi. Let d be a declaration profile; we suppose each di is a
single-minded bid for set Si (and, in general, we will write Si for the desired set in declaration di).
We draw the following conclusion about the bidding choices of rational agents.
8We note, however, that this is not the same as assuming that agents are single-minded; our results hold for
bidders with general private valuations.
24
Mechanism M∗2(A):
Input: Declaration profile d = d1, . . . , dn.
1. d′ ← SIMPLIFY(d).
2. Allocate A(d′), charge critical prices.
Procedure SIMPLIFY:
Input: Declaration profile d = d1, . . . , dn.
1. For each i ∈ [n]:
2. Choose Si ∈ argmaxS{di(S)}, breaking
ties in favour of smaller sets.
3. di
′ ← (Si, di(Si)).
4. Return (d′1, . . . , d
′
n).
Figure 2: Simplifying declarations in a critical price mechanism.
Lemma 5.7 Let A be monotone strongly loser independent allocation rule, and fix type profile v.
Then for each agent i, a single-minded declaration di for set Si is an undominated strategy for
mechanism M∗2(A) if and only if di(Si) = vi(Si).
Proof: Fix some d−i and suppose di is a single-minded declaration for set Si On input (di,d−i),
mechanism M∗2(A) either allocates Si or ∅ to agent i. Thus agent i’s utility for declaring di,
ui(di,d−i), is vi(Si)−θi(Si,d−i) when di(Si) > θi(Si,d−i), and 0 otherwise (where θi denotes critical
prices with respect to M∗2(A)). A declaration of di(Si) = vi(S) therefore maximizes ui(di,d−i) for
all d−i.
Next suppose that di(Si) 6= vi(Si); we will show that di is dominated. Let di′ be the single-
minded declaration for Si at value vi(Si). Suppose there is some d−i such that θi
A(Si,d−i) lies
strictly between di(Si) and vi(Si). For simplicity we will assume such a d−i exists; handling
the general case requires only a technical extension of notation9. Then if di(Si) < vi(Si), then
ui(di
′,d−i) > 0 = ui(di,d−i). Otherwise, if di(Si) > vi(Si)), then ui(di
′,d−i) ≥ 0 > ui(di,d−i).
Thus, in either case, we have ui(di
′,d−i) > ui(di,d−i), and therefore declaration di
′ strictly domi-
nates declaration di. ✷
Given Lemma 5.7, we can analyze the efficiency of equilibria of M∗2(A) in a manner identical
to M2(A). Rather than explicitly assuming that agents do not overbid, Lemma 5.7 implies that
they will not.
Theorem 5.8 Suppose A is a c-approximate monotone strongly loser independent allocation rule,
and that b(·) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of M∗2(A). Then the expected welfare when agents declare
according to b is a (c+ 1) approximation to the expected optimal welfare.
9If θi
A(Si,d−i) never lies between di(Si) and vi(Si)) for any d−i, thenMA(di,d−i) =MA(di
′,d−i) for all d−i, so
di and di
′ are equivalent strategies. We can therefore think of di as being “the same” as a single-minded declaration
for Si at value vi(Si). We will ignore this technical issue for the remainder of the proof, in the interest of clarity.
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5.4 Calculating Critical Prices
For many allocation algorithms (such as all of the algorithms discussed in Section 2.5), the calcu-
lation of critical prices is a simple task, which can be performed in parallel with the computation
of an allocation profile. We leave the development of such pricing methods to the creators of the
allocation algorithms to which our reduction may be applied. However, even if a specially-tailored
algorithm for computing exact critical prices is not available, we note that critical prices for a given
black-box greedy algorithm can be determined to within an additive ǫ error in polynomial time via
simple binary search. Thus, assuming that valuation space is discretized by multiples of ǫ, critical
prices can be determined efficiently. If valuation space is continuous, then our interpretation is
that any equilibrium for the (exact) critical-price mechanism will be an (additive) ǫ-approximate
equilibrium for a mechanism that uses ǫ-approximate critical prices.
We now describe the procedure for determining critical prices in more detail. Fix greedy allo-
cation rule A, agent i, and declarations d. Suppose that Ai(di,d−i) = S. We wish to resolve the
value of θi(S,d−i) in the range [0, di(S)] using binary search in the following way. For all z ≥ 0,
write di
z for the single-minded declaration for set S at value z. Given query value z ∈ [0, di(S)], we
check if Ai(diz, di) = S. If so, decrease the value of z; otherwise, increase the value of z. Since A is
monotone, we have that Ai(diz,d−i) = S if and only if z > θi(S,d−i). This procedure resolves the
value of v to within ǫ in O(log di(S)/ǫ) iterations. Thus, for any given input to mechanismM2(A),
the critical prices for all agents’ allocated sets can be found in O(n log(vmax/ǫ)) invocations of
algorithm A, where vmax = maxi,S di(S).
6 Conclusion and open problems
A central theme in algorithmic mechanism design concerns the transformation of algorithms into
mechanisms that satisfy some game-theoretic solution concept (e..g incentive compatability, ap-
proximations at equilbrium). In contrast to incentive compatibility (where generally we do not
expect to be able to preserve approximation bounds), we show that for a wide class of greedy
algorithms, approximation bounds for combinatorial allocation algorithms can be transformed into
mechanisms that enjoy closely matching price of anarchy bounds. Notably, these results apply to
Bayesian equilibira and some forms of repeated auctions.
We leave open a number of interesting challenges. Our results are motivated by, and pertain
to, monotone greedy algorithms as formally defined in Section 2.4. In fact, the key property of
such algorithms are that they are monotone strongly loser-independent as defined in Section 3 and,
with the exception of the results for correlated equilibria and best response dynamics, our results
hold for arbitrary monotone strongly loser-independent algorithms. In particular, our result for
correlated equilibria of the first-price mechanism requires that the allocation algorithm A is a fixed
order greedy algorithm and achieves a price of anarchy bound of 4c, in contrast to our c + o(1)
result for independent agent distributions. Can the price of anarchy bound for correlated equilibria
be improved? Can it be extended to adaptive greedy or more generally strongly loser independent
algorithms?
Greedy algorithms for allocation problems often provide the best known approximations for
combinatorial auction problems, but are nevertheless a restricted class of algorithms. The basic
open question in this regard is: for what class of allocation algorithms can a given approximation
algorthm A be transformed into a deterministic or randomized mechanism M(A) that provides a
POA bound (closely) matching A’s approximation ratio? We also note that our framework does
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not capture all algorithms that are typically thought of as greedy, since our definition assumes that
it is the player-allocation pairs that are considerd greedily. This excludes, for example, the greedy
algorithm for combinatorial auctions where the valuation function of every agent is a monotone
submodular function. That algorithm considers each item (in any arbitrary order) and awards it
to the agent having the maximum marginal gain for that item. This suggests the question as to
whether or not price of anarchy results could be extended to more general forms of greedy allocation
rules. Similarly, the recent Buchbinder et al [9] randomized online algorithm for unconstrained non-
monotone submodular maximzation also considers items (rather than bids) in a greedy alglorithm.
Can our methodology be extended to include non monotone combinatorial auctions (i.e. no free
disposal)? It is also interesting to consider more general settings of incomplete information, such
as interdependent valuations — See Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [31].
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A Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
As stated in section 4, the power of our pure price of anarchy bounds such as Theorem 4.3, is
marred by the fact that, for some problem instances, the mechanism M1(A) is not guaranteed to
have a pure Nash equilibrium. This is true even under the assumption that private valuations and
payments are discretized, so that all values and payments are multiples of some aribtrarily small
ǫ > 0. A simple example for M1(A) is given below.
Example A.1 Consider an instance of the combinatorial auction problem with two objects, M =
{a, b}, and three agents. Our feasibility constraint is that each agent can be assigned at most one
object, and moreover agent 2 cannot be allocated object b and agent 3 cannot be allocated object a.
Let A be the greedy algorithm that ranks bids by value. Suppose the true types of the agents are as
follows: v1(a) = 4, v1(b) = 2, v2(a) = 3, v2(b) = 0, v3(a) = 0, and v3(b) = 3.
We now prove that no pure Nash equilibrium exists for this example, even if we assume that
agents declare multiples10 of some ǫ > 0. Assume for contradiction that there is a Nash equilibrium
d for type profile v and mechanism M1(A).
We know that agent 1 does not win item b with a payment greater than 2, as this would cause
him negative utility (so he would certainly not be in equilibrium). Thus it must be that A3(d) = {b},
since otherwise agent 3 could change his declaration to win {b} and increase his utility. Thus, since
agent 1 does not win item {b}, we conclude that A1(d) = {a}, since otherwise agent 1 could change
his declaration to win {a} and increase his utility.
Now note that if d1({a}) < 3, agent 2 could increase his utility by making a winning declaration
for {a}. Thus d1({a}) ≥ 3, and hence u1(d) ≤ 4− 3 = 1. This also implies that d1({a}) > d1({b}),
so agent 3 would win {b} regardless of his bid. Thus, since agent 3 maximizes his utility up to an
10That is, our lack of pure equilibrium is not due to the possibility of infinitesimal improvements. One can also
interpret our example as demonstrating that there is no (1 + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium for small ǫ > 0.
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additive ǫ, it must be that d3({b}) ≤ ǫ. But then agent 1 could improve his utility by changing his
declaration and bidding 0 for {a} and 2ǫ for {b}, obtaining utility 2 − 2ǫ > 1. Therefore d is not
an equilibrium, a contradiction.
B Combining Mechanisms
A standard technique in the design of allocation rules is to consider both a greedy rule that favours
allocation of small sets, and a simple rule that allocates all objects to a single bidder, and apply
whichever solution obtains the better result [4, 8, 18, 25]. When bidders are single-minded, such
a combination rule will be incentive-compatible [25]. We would like to extend our results to cover
rules of this form, but the price of anarchy for such a rule (with either the first-price or critical-price
payment scheme) may be much worse than its combinatorial approximation ratio. Consider the
following example.
Example B.1 Consider the combinatorial auction problem. Suppose A is the non-adaptive greedy
algorithm with priority rule r(i, S, v) = v if |S| ≤ √m, and r(i, S, v) = 0 otherwise. Let A′ be
the non-adaptive greedy algorithm with priority rule r(i, S, v) = v if S = M , and r(i, S, v) = 0
otherwise. Then A′ simply allocates the set of all objects to the player that declares the highest
value for it. Let Amax be the allocation rule that applies whichever of A or A′ obtains the better
result; that is, on input d, Amax returns A(d) if SW (A(d),d) > SW (A′(d),d), otherwise returns
A′(d). It is known that Amax is a O(
√
m) approximate algorithm [25].
Our instance of the CA problem is the following. We have n = m ≥ 2, say with M =
{a1, . . . , am}. Choose ǫ > 0 arbitrarily small. For each i, the private type of agent i, vi, is the
pointwise maximum of two single-minded valuation functions: one for set {ai} at value 1, and the
other for set M at value 1 + ǫ. An optimal allocation profile for v would assign {ai} to each agent
i, for a total welfare of m.
We construct a declaration profile as follows. For each i, di is the single-minded valuation
function for set M at value 1 + ǫ. On input d, Amax will assign M to some agent, for a total
welfare of 1 + ǫ. Also, d is a pure Nash equilibrium for M1(Amax) and Mcrit(Amax): all agents
receive a utility of 0, and there is no way for any single agent to obtain positive utility by deviating
from d. Taking ǫ→ 0, we conclude that the price of anarchy for any of these mechanisms is Ω(m),
which does not match the combinatorial O(
√
m) approximation ratio of Amax.
In light of the example above, one must consider different ways to combine two allocation
rules. For instance, one could implement each rule as a separate mechanism, then randomly choose
between the two with equal probability. Such an approach can work well when the two allocation
rules work with disjoint parts of the declaration space, so that agents can optimize their bids
separately for each mechanism.
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